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This paper presents a new theoretical viewpoint blended from the perspectives that 
mathematical meaning is extracted (from objects falling under a particular concept) and that 
mathematical meaning is given (to objects that an individual interacts with). It is elaborated 
that neither uni-directional framing (whether involving extracting meaning or giving 
meaning) provides a comprehensive account of the complex emergence of evolving forms 
of meaning. It is argued for a framing that construes sense-making in mathematics as 
dialogical: where what meaning one extracts is a function of what meaning is given to, and 
vice versa.  
Sense-making in mathematics has been a critical theme in research on mathematics 
knowing, learning, and teaching. Schoenfeld (1992), for instance, discussed mathematics 
as an act of sense-making and underlined sense-making activities as vital for students 
coming to understand and use mathematics in meaningful ways. Von Glasersfeld (1995), 
on the other hand, regarded students as active sense-makers in mathematical concept 
formation, that is, students actively seek comprehensibility of a mathematical concept. 
Though consideration of sense-making in mathematics has a long tradition in, and is 
undoubtedly an essential topic of, mathematics education, the notion of sense-making is 
somewhat ambiguous, often framed in opposing perspectives. Two of those perspectives 
are the substance of this paper that are grounded in a division of two strands of 
mathematical concept formation (i.e., abstraction-from-actions approaches and abstraction-
from-objects approaches). Recently, Scheiner (2016) moved the discussion from simple 
comparison towards a synergy of theoretical frameworks that acknowledges the 
complementarity of the two strands of mathematical concept formation. Specifically, 
Scheiner (2016) blended theoretical frameworks on two fundamental kinds of abstraction 
(reflective abstraction and structural abstraction) and their respective forms of sense-
making (extracting meaning and giving meaning). This blending argues strongly against 
dismissing abstraction from objects as irrelevant for mathematical concept formation, and 
instead aims to overcome misleading dichotomies of abstraction from actions and 
abstraction from objects, as Piaget (1977/2001) put forth.  
This paper contributes to the current conversation of the relation between extracting 
meaning and giving meaning. The paper makes a case for a dialogical framing of these two 
forms of sense-making that has the potential to account for the complex dynamics involved 
in mathematical concept formation, dynamics which cannot be accounted for considering 
extracting meaning and giving meaning separately. In doing so, some theoretical assertions 
are outlined that orient the general discussion of concept formation and sense-making. 
Afterwards, explicit and implicit assumptions underlying the respective forms of sense-
making are examined. Then, the dialogical framing of extracting meaning and giving 
meaning is delineated, revealing the complex dynamics involved in mathematical concept 
formation. 
 670 
Theoretical Orientations  
The theoretical foundation for coordinating the two strands of mathematical concept 
formation, as presented in Scheiner (2016), relies on and projects several theoretical 
insights revealed by Frege (1892a, 1892b) that have informed a variety of theoretical 
perspectives on mathematical knowing, thinking, and learning (see Arzarello, Bazzini, & 
Chiappini, 2001; Duval, 2006; Radford, 2002). In particular, the theoretical foundation in 
Scheiner (2016) shares Frege’s (1892a) assertion that a mathematical concept is not 
directly accessible through the concept itself but only through objects that act as proxies 
for it. However, mathematical objects (unlike objects of natural sciences) cannot be 
apprehended by human senses (we cannot, for instance, ‘see’ the object), but only via some 
‘mode of presentation’ (Frege, 1892b) – that is, objects need to be expressed by using signs 
or other semiotic means such as a gestures, pictures, or linguistic expression (Radford, 
2002).  
 
Figure 1. On referenceF, senseF, and ideaF (reproduced from Scheiner, 2016, p. 179). 
The ‘mode of presentation’ (or ‘way of presentation’) of an object is to be 
distinguished from the object that is represented, as individuals often confuse a senseF 
(‘Sinn’) of an expression (or representation) with the referenceF (‘Bedeutung’) of an 
expression (or representation) (the subscript F indicates that these terms refer to Frege, 
1892b). The referenceF of an expression is the object it refers to, whereas the senseF is the 
way in which the object is given to the mind, or in other words, it is the thought 
(‘Gedanke’) expressed by the expression (or representation) (Frege, 1892b). The 
expression ‘a = b’, for instance, is informative, in contrast to the expression ‘a = a’, as the 
senseF of ‘a’ differs from the senseF of ‘b’. The upshot of this is, sensesF capture the 
epistemological and cognitive significance of expressions. This implies one of Frege’s 
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decisive assertions, that an object can only be apprehended via a senseF of an expression 
(or representation): the senseF orients how a person thinks of the object being referred to. 
Thus, it seems reasonable to understand Frege’s (1892b) notion of an ideaF (‘Vorstellung’) 
as the manner in which a person makes senseF of the world. IdeasF can interact with each 
other and form more compressed knowledge structures, called conceptions. A general 
outline of this view is provided in Figure 1.  
There are several ways that individuals can make sense of a mathematical concept; the 
focus here is on Pinto’s (1998) distinction between extracting meaning and giving meaning 
with respect to sense-making of a formal concept definition: “Extracting meaning involves 
working within the content, routinizing it, using it, and building its meaning as a formal 
construct. Giving meaning means taking one’s personal concept imagery as a starting point 
to build new knowledge.” (Pinto, 1998, pp. 298-299) 
Gray, Pinto, Pitta, and Tall (1999) stated that in giving meaning a person attempts to 
build from their own perspective, trying to give meaning to mathematics from current 
cognitive structures. Tall (2013) elucidated that these two approaches are related to a 
‘natural approach’, that builds on the concept image, and a ‘formal approach’, that builds 
formal theorems based on the formal definition. Scheiner (2016) linked extracting meaning 
to the manipulation of objects and reflection on the variations in modes of presentation 
when objects are manipulated. These cognitive processes are often associated with Piaget’s 
(1977/2001) reflective abstraction, that is, abstraction through coordination of actions on 
mental objects (e.g., Dubinsky, 1991). Giving meaning, on the other hand, was related to 
attaching an ideaF to a mode of presentation. That is, an individual gives meaning to the 
objects one interacts with from the perspective an individual has taken.  
On Extracting Meaning 
A common assumption is that the meaning of a mathematical concept is an inherent 
quality of objects that fall under a particular concept, and that this quality is to be 
extracted. This extraction of meaning is realised through the manipulation of objects and 
reflection of variations of sensesF when objects are manipulated. These cognitive processes 
are often associated with reflective abstraction, that is, reflecting on the coordination of 
actions on mental objects (see Piaget, 1977/2001). Similarly, Duval (2006) argued that via 
systematic variation of one representation of an object and reflecting on resulting 
variations in another representation of the same object, an individual can recognise what is 
mathematically relevant and separate the senseF of a representation from the referenceF of a 
representation. Such a view asserts that individuals internalise extracted mathematical 
structures and relations associated with their actions and reflections of their actions on 
objects. It gives the impression that individuals construct mental models (ideasF or 
conceptions) that correspond to an ideal realm (objects or concepts), though it might be 
read as taking a ‘trivial constructivist’ position (von Glasersfeld, 1989): the view that a 
necessary condition of knowledge is that individuals construct, constitute, make, or 
produce their own understanding (see Ernest, 2010). More importantly, such a view seems 
to suggest a ‘conception-to-concept direction of fit’ (see Scheiner, 2017) that is, 
mathematical concept formation is regarded as individuals constructing conceptions that 
best reflect a (seemingly given) mathematical concept (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. From object to ideaF to conception. 
On Giving Meaning  
In the attempt to coordinate abstraction-from-actions and abstraction-from-objects 
approaches, a new understanding of abstraction emerged: abstraction is not so much the 
extraction of a previously unnoticed meaning of a concept (or the recognition of structure 
common to various objects), but rather a process of giving meaning to the objects an 
individual interacts with from the perspective an individual has taken. Abstraction, as such, 
is more focused on “the richness of the particular [that] is embodied not in the concept as 
such but rather in the objects that falling under the concept [...]. This view gives primacy to 
meaningful, richly contextualised forms of (mathematical) structure over formal 
(mathematical) structures” (Scheiner, 2016, p. 175). This is to say, individuals give 
meaning to the objects they interact with by attaching ideasF to objects or, more precisely, 
by attaching ideasF to the sensesF expressed by the representations in which an object 
actualises. Recent research investigating the contextuality, complementarity, and 
complexity of this sense-making strategy (see Scheiner & Pinto, 2018) asserted that in 
contrast to Frege (1892b), who construed senseF in a disembodied fashion as a way an 
object is given to an individual, an individual assigns senseF to object. However, what 
senseF is assigned to an object is a function of what ideaF is activated in the immediate 
context. In this view, ideasF direct forming the modes of presentation under which an 
individual refers to an object. As such, it is a person’s complex system of ideasF that 
directs forming a senseF, rather than merely the object a representation refers to. This 
research also indicated that individuals might even give meaning to objects that are yet to 
become. This means that although an object does not have a being prior to the individual’s 
attempts to know it, an individual might create a new ideaF that directs their thinking to 
potential objects, or more precisely: an individual might create an ideaF that allows 
assigning a new senseF to objects that are yet to become. That is, individuals might ascribe 
meaning beyond what is apparent. It is proposed that the creation of such ideasF is of the 
nature of what Koestler (1964) described as ‘bisociation’, and Fauconnier and Turner 
(2002) elaborated as ‘conceptual blending’; that is, to construct a partial match between 
frames from established conceptual domains, in order to project selectively from those 
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domains into a novel hybrid frame, comprised of unique (emergent) structure of its own 
(see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Transforming ideasF to give (new) meaning to an object. 
The key insight here is that unrelated ideasF can be transformed into new ideasF that 
allow ‘setting the mind’ not only to actual instances, but also to potential instances that 
might become ‘reality’ in the future. In such cases, conceptual development is not merely 
meant to reflect an actual concept, but rather to create a concept: a view that suggests a 
‘concept-to-conception direction of fit’ (see Scheiner, 2017) that is, mathematical concept 
formation is regarded as individuals creating a concept that best fits their conceptions. 
Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), drew attention to the power of (new) metaphors to 
create a (new) reality rather than simply to provide a way of conceptualising a pre-existing 
reality: “changes in our conceptual system do change what is real for us and affect how we 
perceive the world and act upon those perceptions” (pp. 145-146.). It is reasonable to 
assume that students transform ideasF to express a yet-to-be-realised state of a concept. 
This accentuates Tall’s (2013) assertion that the “whole development of mathematical 
thinking is presented as a combination of compression and blending of knowledge 
structures to produce crystalline concepts that can lead to imaginative new ways of 
thinking mathematically in new contexts” (p. 28).  
Towards a Dialogical Framing 
Each of the previous two sections articulated a particular form of sense-making: 
extracting meaning from objects (via manipulating objects and reflecting on the variations) 
and giving meaning to objects (via attaching existing and new ideasF to objects). These two 
forms of sense-making seem to differ in their directions of fit: extracting meaning involves 
individuals’ attempts to construct conceptions that aim to fit a concept (conception-to-
concept direction of fit), whereas giving meaning involves individuals’ attempts to create a 
concept that aims to fit their conceptions (concept-to-conception direction of fit) (for a 
detailed discussion, see Scheiner, 2017). 
Instead of construing extracting meaning and giving meaning as independent processes 
that point in two opposing directions, it is argued here for a bi-directional theoretical 
framing of mathematical concept formation. Specifically, it is argued for a dialogical 
framing of extracting meaning and giving meaning, asserting that extracting meaning and 
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giving meaning are interdependent (rather than independent): what meaning one extracts is 
very much a function of what meaning is given to, and vice versa (see Figure 4). This 
dialogical framing can better account for the complex emergence of evolving forms of 
meaning: meaning not only emerges (from Latin emergere, ‘to become visible’) via 
reflection on manipulations of objects, but also evolves (from Latin evolvere, ‘to become 
more complex’) via transforming previously constructed ideasF (see Scheiner, 2017). 
  
Figure 4. On the dialogue of extracting meaning and ascribing meaning. 
The dialogical framing of extracting meaning and giving meaning acknowledges the 
complex emergence of evolving forms of meaning that cannot be accounted for by viewing 
extracting meaning or giving meaning as separate. Extracting meaning and giving 
meaning, though they have value in their own right, are restricted, and restricting, in their 
accounts of mathematical concept formation. This is due to the ‘hidden determinisms' 
inherent in the two approaches: extracting meaning assumes that what dictates meaning is 
the concept itself; while giving meaning advocates an individual's conceptions as the 
determinants of all meaning. The dialogical framing, in contrast, is not deterministic but bi-
directional: mathematical concept formation involves processes that direct from conception 
to concept as much as it involves processes that direct from concept to conception. As 
such, the dialogical framing is more than a matter of recasting the concept-conception 
divide: it underlines that concept and conception are not static and apart but fluid and co-
specifying.  
Figure 5 is an alternative to the reductionist view taken in respective approaches of 
extracting meaning (see Figure 2) and giving meaning (see Figure 3), both being rather 
uni-directional and deterministic in orientation. The dialogical framing provides new 
interpretative possibilities regarding the complex dynamics in mathematical concept 
formation, allowing for a move beyond simplistic assertions about linearity and 
determinism (that were transposed from analytical science and analytical philosophy onto 
discussions of mathematical concept formation). Figure 5 attends to the complexity in 
mathematical concept formation and speaks to the nonlinear, emergent characters of 
evolving forms of mathematical meaning (see Pirie & Kieren, 1994; Schoenfeld, Smith, & 
Arcavi, 1993).   
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Figure 5. A complexivist frame: on the complex interaction between concept and conception. 
Conclusion  
This paper presents a new theoretical perspective blended from the existing 
perspectives that mathematical meaning is extracted (from objects falling under a 
particular concept) and that mathematical meaning is given (to objects that an individual 
interacts with by that individual). This blending seeks to frame mathematical concept 
formation as bi-directional (where what meaning one extracts is a function of what 
meaning is given to, and vice versa) and to recast the concept-conception divide (by 
viewing concept and conception as fluid and co-specifying instead of static and apart). In 
doing so, the dialogical framing presents a view of mathematical concept formation that is 
complex, dynamic, non-linear, and possessed of emergent characteristics. 
This theoretical contribution makes the case that neither uni-directional framing of 
mathematical concept formation (whether involving extracting meaning or giving 
meaning) provides a comprehensive account of the complex emergence of evolving forms 
of meaning. It is argued for an alternative framing that acknowledges mathematical 
concept formation as both directed from concept to conception and from conception to 
concept. Mathematical concept formation, then, is construed as an ongoing, intertwined 
process of extracting meaning and giving meaning, in which conceptions shape, and are 
shaped by, the concepts with which an individual interacts. 
This dialogical framing brings a greater insight: that any attempt to frame cognition in 
terms of mind over matter or matter over mind is misleading, as cognition is bi-directional: 
from the outside in (mind- to-world direction of fit) and from the inside out (world-to-mind 
direction of fit). That is, mind and world are engaged in a co-creative interaction: mind is 
shaped by the world and mind shapes the world. Such a world is subjectively articulated, in 
that its objectivity is relative to how it has been shaped by the knower (see Reason, 1998). 
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Such a dialogical framing is not so much a unification of any monism (that sees, for 
instance, mind as situated within its world), nor of any dualism (that sees mind apart from 
the world), but rather is an acknowledgment that mind is an integral part of the world, and 
as such both mind and world are in a constant state of flux, changing in the ever-unfolding 
process of extracting meaning and giving meaning. 
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